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VOLUME XXX APRIL, 1924 NUMBER 3
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE INDUS-
TRIAL STRUGGLE
SIDNEY POST SIAIPSON*
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and noth-
ing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."- . JUS-
TICE HOLmEs.
During recent years there has been much discussion of the re-
spective legal privileges of employers and employees in the indus-
trial struggle. Various "rights" have been claimed and maintain-
ed, and there have been repeated assertions that certain of these
rights are protected by the Constitution of the United States. Thus
there has been talk of the "right of collective bargaining", of the
"right to operate an open shop", of the "right to operate a closed
shop". Furthermore, there has been much discussion of an alleg-
ed conflict between these various rights and particularly between
the "right of collective bargaining" and the "right to operate an
open shop."
The issues involved are of the utmost importance and have prop-
erly been so regarded by the various disputants. Numerous strikes
and lock-outs, causing great financial loss to employers, great pri-
vation to employees and their families, and great hardship to the
public, have resulted from misunderstanding as to these "rights".
Accompanying these strikes or lock-outs there has been not a little
bloodshed, and even actual loss of life, since the parties to the
industrial struggle have not yet learned always to abide by the
rules of the legal order.
*Of the washington, D. C. bar.
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It is therefore of great importance that there be a clear under-
standing of what these "rights" are, and of the extent to which
they are protected by the Constitution. If any progress is to be
made toward industrial peace, it is fundamental that the rules
governing the industrial struggle, as they are at present consti-
tuted, shall be obeyed and respected by all parties. It may be.
that some of these rules are unnecessary or obsolete, or even un-
fair, but, if that is so, the thing to do is to change those rules in
the manner prescribed by law for such change, and not to violate
them; and it is especially incumbent upon those who believe that
the rules as at present laid down are not all they should be, to de-
vote their attention to securing changes in the proper and orderly-
manner, and not to encourage violations. For this reason, it is es-
pecially important to have a clear idea of what those rules are, and'
of how far they are definitely established.
It is the purpose of this paper to attempt an inquiry into one
phase of this question, to consider certain of these alleged rights,
and to point out just which of them have been held to be consti-
tutionally protected, and which of them have not been so held. It
is further proposed to venture into the difficult realm of proph-
ecy, and to weigh the probabilities as to future constitutional
decision. In other words, the purpose of this paper is to see just
what are to be considered the present rules governing the industrial
struggle, and especially to ascertain which of these rules can be
changed only by amending the Constitution of the United States.
A necessary preliminary to any such discussion is a careful def-
inition of terms. Here, perhaps to a greater extent than in any
other field of the law, we are dealing with slippery words. "Open
shop", "closed shop", "collective bargaining "--each of these
terms is a Pandora's Box of ambiguity, and contains within itself
germs of dissension. It is therefore absolutely necessary, in the
interests of precision of thought, to state clearly the sense in which.
the terms just referred to will be used in any particular discussion.
For the purposes of this paper the following definitions will be
used:
An open shop is an industrial unit or a department of such a un-
it, in which the employer hires men regardless of their member
ship or non-membership in any labor organization, and where his
employees are free to join or refrain from joining such an organi-
zation. There are two principal forms of the open shop. One
may be termed the union open shop, where the employer deals with
a labor organization representing his employees, but where there.
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is no discrimination against non-union men. The union open shop
may involve the recognition of a labor organization not confined to
a particular operating unit, or it may involve simply the recogni-
tion of a so-called "company union". The other form is the
non-union open shop, where the employer does not deal with any
labor organization but where there is no discrimination against
union members.
The term "closed shop" is of little value, since it applies equal-
ly to the description of two radically different forms of labor re-
lations-the sole common element being that certain consequences.
are attached by the employer to the membership or non-member-
ship of his employees in a labor organization. In the closed non-
union shop the employer hires only men who are not members of
a labor organization, and the employees are not permitted to be-
come members of such an organization while remaining in the
employment. In the closed union shop, the employer hires only
men who are members of a labor organization and the employees.
are required to remain members of such an organization so long
as they continue in the employment.
The term "collective bargaining", like the term "closed shop",.
has been used in so many different ways as to have become prac-
tically meaningless. It has been used to cover at least three wide-
ly different situations. The first situation is where all or a con-
siderable proportion of the employees of a particular industrial
unit meet with the management to discuss questions of commoil
interest through representatives of their own choosing who are
themselves employees, and where the organization for such bar-
gaining is confined to the operating unit. This is the so-called
"company union" system. The second situation differs from the
first in that the organization is not confined to the employees of
a particular operating unit, but resembles it in that the employer
deals only with his own employees. The third situation is where
the employees deal with their employer, or where the employees
of a number of operating units deal with their associated employ-
ers, through representatives chosen by the employees, who are not.
necessarily employes themselves. In order to avoid the confus-
ion inevitable if the term "collective bargaining" is used, its use
will be avoided and instead the actual situation involved in each
particular ease will be set forth.
With these definitions in mind it is possible to proceed to a con-
sideration of the questions which this paper will attempt to answer.
These questions are three in number: (1) To what extent does
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the Constitution of the United States protect the right of employ-
ers and employees to contract together for the purpose of maintain-
ing a closed non-union shop, and to what extent does it protect the
continuance of that contractual relationship when entered into?
(2) To what extent does the Constitution of the United States
protect the right of employers and employees to contract together
for the purpose of maintaining a closed union shop, and to what ex-
tent does it protect the continuance of that contractual relation-
ship when entered into? (3) To what extent does the Consti-
tution of the United States protect the right of employers and em-
ployees to contract together for the purpose of maintaining an
open shop and to what extent does it protect the continuance of
that contractual relationship when entered into?
I.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
The applicable provisions of the Constitution are the due pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment1 and the due process and equal
protection clauses2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The limitations
imposed upon Congress by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment are the same as those imposed upon the legislatures of
the several states by the similar provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment3 ; and it has been repeatedly held by the Supreme
Court of the United States that these provisions protect liberty
of contract4 . The right freely to enter into contracts is regarded
as partaking of the characteristics of both liberty and property.
As is said by Mr. Justice Pitney in the case of Coppage v. Kan-
sas5 :
"Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of
private property-partaking of the nature of each-is the right
d u . . .. nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U. S. Const., Amendment V. This limitation applies only to the
federal government. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 242 (1833.)
2 . . . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U. S. Const., Amendment XIV.
3 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 534 (1884) ; Yesler v. Washington
Harbor Line Commissioners, 146 U. S. 646, 655 (1892) ; Hlibben v. Smith. 191 U. S.
310, 325 (1903). Of. Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401, 410 (1905).
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897) ; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S.
45 (1905) ; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908) ; Coppage v. Kansas
236 U. S. 1 (1915) ; Minimum Wage Board v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525
(1923) ; Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522
(1923). The rule is firmly established, although it has met with powerful adverse
criticism. See Charles E. Shattuck, "The True Meaning of the Term 'Liberty'
in those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions which Protect "Life, Liberty
and Property." 4 HAnv. L. Rgv. 365 (1891) ; Roscoe Pound. "Liberty of Contract,"
18 YALE L. J. 454 (1909).
G 236 U. S. 1, 14 (1915).
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to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among
such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor
and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of
property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered
with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long
established constitutional sense".
However, freedom of contract is not an absolute right, and the
legislature may prohibit or regulate certain forms of contracts un-
der the police power. As is stated in the case of Lochner v. New
York':
"Both property and liberty are held on such reasonable con-
ditions as may be imposed by the governing power of the state
in the exercise of those powers, and with such conditions the
Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere .......
In every case ....... .that comes before this court, there-
fore, where legislation of this character is concerned, and where
the protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the ques-
tion necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appro-
priate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an un-
reasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the
right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into
those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him ap-
propriate or necessary for the support of himself and his fam-
ily' .
7
In accordance with these principles, legislation has been upheld
which prohibits contracts in restraint of trade.8 Similarly, it has
been held constitutional to regulate contracts of service so as to
prevent undue hours of labor, likely to result in injury to the
health of the workers', and limitations on liberty of contract have
1 198 U. S. 45, 53 (1905). This statement of the law was quoted with approval
i. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 173 (1908). See also Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 568 (1911). It for a time appeared
that the Lochner case had been overruled by Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426
(1917). But the Supreme Court has recently re-asserted the authority of the
earlier case. See Minimum Wage Board v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 550
(1923).
7 Compare Minimum Wage Board v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 546
(1923) : "There Is, of course, no such thing as absolute freedom of contract. It
is subject to a great variety of restraints. But freedom of contract is the rule and
restraint the exception ; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can
be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances."
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505 (1898) ; Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 (1898) ; Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S.
115 (1905) ; National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U. S. 115 (1905) ; Carroll v. Green-
wich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401 (1905) ; Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217
U. S. 433 (1910) ; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307 (1911) ; Central
Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157 (1912).
1 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412
(1908) ; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917) ; Radice vi. New York, U. S. Sup.
Ct., Oct. Term, 1923 No. 176, decided March 10, 1924. But see Lochner v. New
York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
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been upheld under the police power in many other cases". The
question in each case is whether the particular limitation upon
the freedom of the individual to enter into contracts is justified by
the police power under the particular circumstances involved. In
determining the question, general definitions of the scope of the
police power are of little value. As the Supreme Court has said,
the line of constitutionality is being gradually pricked out by a
multitude of decisions, some on this side of the line and some on
the other 1 . It is necessary, therefore, to examine the decisions
which have dealt with the various classes of labor relationship un-
der consideration.
Before passing to a consideration of these decisions, however, it
must be noted that the legislatures of the states are subject to
certain constitutional limitations not imposed upon Congress,
since the Fourteenth Amendment contains a prohibition against
depriving any person of the equal protection of the laws, while the
Fifth Amendment contains no such provision 2 . While it is pos-
sible that federal legislation might be so outrageously discrimina-
tory that it would fail to be due process of law13, yet it would
seem to be entirely possible that legislation might be due process
and so valid if passed by Congress, and yet that it might involve a
discriminatory classification which would invalidate it if it were
passed by a state legislature; and this distinction has recently been
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States14 .
20 Prescribing wages and hours of labor on contracts for the performance of public
work; Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 (1903); Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S.
246 (1907). Prescribing method and time for payment of wages; Knoxville Iron
Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13 (1901) ; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539 (1909) ;
Erie R. R. Co. v. williams, 233 U. S. 685 (1914) ; Keokee Consolidated Coke Co.
Iv. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224 (1914). Prohibiting dealing in grain futures; Booth v.
Illinois, 184 U. S. 425 (1902). And see, for a general statement, Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S., 549, 568 (1911). See, however, Minimum
Wage Board v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
1 See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 (1877) ; Hudson County Water
Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 358 (1909) ; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S.
104, 112 (1911). See also Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Lochner v. New York,
198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905) ; "General propositions do not decide concrete cases."
32 See notes 1 and 2, supra.
33 See United States v,. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co., 165 Fed. 742,
745 (1908), per Putnam, J.: "It is necessary to observe the substantial distinction
between the Fifth Amendment, which is obligatory only on the United States, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, which Is obligatory only on the states. The limitation
in the former is 'without due process of law.' In the Fourteenth Amendment this
limitation Is accompanied with a prohibition of the denial of the 'equal protection
of the laws.' Of course, the latter expression is broader than the former, although
it must be conceded that the mere denial of the 'equal protection of the laws'
might run Into the other limitation. It is plain, nevertheless, that mere discrim-
ination in certain particulars does not necessarily have this effect." See also
Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 697 (1891) ; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462.
468 (1891) ; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 604, (1900).
2 See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 340 (1911), per Taft, C. J.:
.. the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to
Congressional but only to state action." Cf. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S.
138, 149 (1909) ; United States v. Heinze, 218 U. S. 532, 546 (1910); Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 161 (1911) ; Second Employers' Liability Cases,
223 U. S. 1, 53 (1912). See also United States v. Adair, 152 Fed. 737. 762
(1907) ; United States v. New York. New Ha'en & Hartford R. R. Co., cit. supra,
note 13.
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With these general principles in mind, it is possible intelligently
to consider the specific problems with which it is the purpose of'
this paper to deal. In dealing with each of them it will be nec-
essary first to investigate the situation at common law, and then
to consider the extent to which the common law rules are pro-
tected by the Constitution from statutory change.
II.
THE CLOSED NON-UNION SHOP
The common-law right of an employer to hire and fire as he-
pleases has never been questioned, and it is perfectly clear that,
in the absence of statute, employment may be denied a man be-
cause of his membership in a labor organization"5 .
Is this common-law right protected by the Constitution so that.
a statute designed to prevent discharge or refusal of employment
on account of membership in a labor organization will be invalid?
On the basis of the decisions, the answer must be in the affirmative.
It is now settled law that the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of an employer to.
operate on a non-union basis. This doctrine was first laid down
by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Adair v. Uni-
ted States,'8 in which a federal statute, making it a criminal of-
fense to discharge an employee of an interstate carrier on account
of his membership in a labor organization, was held unconstitu-
tional under the Fifth Amendment. It is true that the decision
was rested partly on the ground that the legislation in question was.
not a legitimat regulation of commerce, and therefore was outside-
the scope of federal authority ;17 but in the later case of Coppage
v. Kansas" , any doubt as to the authority of the Adair case on the-
broad proposition of due process was removed. In that case it
was held that a statute of Kansas, which made it a misdemeanor-
for any person to exact from an employee an undertaking that he
would not become or remain a member of a labor organization as.
a condition of securing or continuing in employment, was invalid
Is See Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 173 (1908), citing CooLay, TORTS,.
278: "It Is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left at liberty to refuse
business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon
reason, or is the result of whim, caprice or malice. With his reasons neither the-
public nor third person have any legal concern. It is also nis right to have business
relations with anyone with whom he can make contracts, and it be is wrongfully
deprived of this right by others, he is entitled to redress."
16 208 U. S. 161 (1908).
" Accord: United States v. Scott, 148 Fed. 431 (1906) ; Order of Railroad
Telegraphers v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 148 Fed. 437 (1906), appeal dismissed.
214 U. S. 529 (1909).
I 236 U. S. 1 (1915).
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under the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19
No attempt was made to distinguish the Adair case on the ground
that it had been decided under the commerce clause, and the
court followed the earlier decision as controlling. It was argued
that the Adair case was distinguishable, since the statute there
involved prohibited discharge on account of union membership
and not the requiring of an undertaking not to join or remain in
the union as a condition of securing or retaining employment; but
this contention was rejected20 .
The Supreme Court is thus definitely committed to the propo-
sition that any legislation designed to prevent an employer from
operating his establishment on a closed non-union shop basis is
invalid. As the proposition is stated by Mr. Justice Pitney in
Hitchman Coal & Coke Company v. Mitchell21 :
"This court repeatedly has held that the employer is as free
to make non-membership in a union a condition of employment,
as the working man is free to join the union, and that is a part
of the constitutional rights of personal liberty and private prop-
erty, not to be taken away even by legislation, unless through
some proper exercise of the paramount police power."
It is to be noted that Mr. Justice Pitney qualifies his statement
that this right cannot be taken away by the phrase "unless through
some proper exercise of the paramount police power". There
are two conceivable grounds for the exercise of the police power
in such cases. The first is based on the theory that employer and
employee are on an unequal footing as to bargaining power, and
that legislation designed to make them more equal in this regard is
therefore within the scope of the police power 2 . But this conten-
tion has been rejected in the Supreme Court. Thus Mr. Justice
Pitney says, in Coppage v. Kansas2 3 :
19 This was in accord with the practically unanimous current of authority in the
state courts. Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. 1007 (1900); Coffeyville
Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 Pac. 848 (1904) ; State
ex rel. Smith v. Daniels. 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584 (1912) ; State v. Julow.
129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781 (1895) ; People -v. Marcus. 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E.
1073 (1906); State v. Bateman, 7 Ohio N. P. 487 (1900), treating as overruled
Davis v. State, 30 Ohio L. J. 342 (1893) ; State ex rel. Zillman v. Kroutzhy, 114
Wis. 530, 90 N. W. 1098 (1902). So in the lower federal courts. Goldfield Con-
solidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500 (1908). The only
decisions contra were the overruled Ohio case of Davis v. State, supra, and two
Kansas cases, State v. Coppage, 87 Kan. 752, 125 Pac. 8 (1913) and State v. Acken-
hausen, 87 Kan. 792, 125 Pac. 15 (1913), both decided contra to Coffeyville Vitri-
fied Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, supra.
* See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 11 (1915). Of. the dissenting opinion
of Day, J., 236 U. S. 32-40, insisting upon the distinction. See also FREUND,
POLICE POWER, § 326.
245 U. S. 229, 251 (1917).
2 See Roscoe Pound, "Liberty of Contract," 18 YALE L. J. 454 (1909).
236 U. S. 1, 17 (1915).
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"As to the interest of the employed, it is said by the Kansas
Supreme Court to be a matter of common knowledge that em-
ployees, as a rule, are not financially able to be as independent
in making contracts for the sale of their labor as are employers
in making a contract purchase thereof. No doubt, wherever the
right of private property exists, there must and will be inequal-
ities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties ne-
gotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by cir-
cumstances. This applies to all contracts and not merely to that
between employer and employee. Indeed, a little reflection will
show that wherever the right of private property and the right of
free contract co-exist, each party when contracting is inevitably
influenced by the question whether he has much property, or lit-
tle, or none; for the contract is made to the very end that each
may gain something that he needs or desires more urgently
than that which he proposes to give in exchange. And, since it
is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common, some
persons must have more property than others, it is from the na-
ture of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the
right of private property without at the same time recognizing
as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary
result of the exercise of those rights. But the 14th Amend-
ment, in declaring that a state shall not 'deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law', gives to
each of these an equal sanction; it recognizes liberty and prop-
erty as coexistent human rights, and debars the states from any
unwarranted interference with either.
"And since a state may not strike them down directly, it is
clear that it may not do so indirectly, as by declaring in effect
that the public good requires the removal of those inequalities
that are but the normal and inevitable result of the exercise,
and then invoking the police power in order to remove the in-
equalities, without other object in view. The police power is
broad, and not easily defined, but it cannot be given the wide
scope that is here asserted for it, without in effect nullifying the
constitutional guaranty".
The second conceivable ground for invoking the police power
is an alleged social interest in the existence and functioning of
labor unions24. On this point the court has said, in Coppage v.
KanaS 2 5 :
"But no attempt is made, or could reasonably be made, to
sustain the purpose to strengthen these voluntary organizations,
any more than other voluntary associations of persons, as a le-
gitimate object for the exercise of the police power. They are
2 See Francis B. Sayre, "Inducing Breach of Contract," 36 HARv. L. REV.
663, 694-695 (1923). See also 34 HARV. L. REV. 880, 884 (1921).
236 U. S. 1, 16 (1915).
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not public institutions, charged by law with public or govern.
mental duties, such as would render the maintenance of their
membership a matter of direct concern to the general welfare.
If they were, a different question would be presented".
Furthermore, it has recently been held that the securing of a
minimum wage for women is not a legitimate object for the exer-
cise of the police power 6 , and that the public interest in an uninter-
rupted supply of food or of coal is not a sufficient justification
for a compulsory wage arbitration law2 7 . These cases go far to
show that the present court is very reluctant to extend the boun-
daries of the police power any further than has already been
done28 . Hence it can confidently be asserted that the Constitu-
tion of the United States protects and guarantees to employers the
right to operate a closed non-union shop.
The existence of the right of employers to operate on a non-
union closed shop basis in no way conflicts with the constitutional
right of employees to become members of labor organizations -9 .
Liberty to contract simply means liberty to enter into a contract
provided another person can be found who is willing to enter into
the particular sort of contract desired. This is brought out by the
statement of Mr. Justice Pitney, in Coppage v. Kansas30 :
"Conceding the full right of the individual to join the union,
he has no inherent right to do this and still remain in the em-
ploy of one who is unwilling to employ a union man, any more
than the same individual has a right to join the union without
the consent of that organization ....... .. and the liberty
of making contracts does not include the liberty to procure enm-
ployment from an unwilling employer, or without a fair under-
standing. Nor may the employer be foreclosed by legislation
from exercising the same freedom of choice that is the right of
the employee.
"To ask a man to agree, in advance, to refrain from affiliation
with the union while retaining a certain position of employ-
ment, is not to ask him to give up any part of his constitutional
freedom. He is free to decline the employment on those terms,
= Minimum Wage Board v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
2 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1923);
Dorchy v. Kansas, U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1923, No. 163, decided March 10, 1924.
28 See the remarks of Holmes, J., in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S.
343. 416 (1922), and of Sutherland. J., in Minimum Wage Board v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 546, 552 (1923).
- It has often been asserted that there is such a conflict. See, for example,
Report of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on the Situation in the
West Virginia Coal Fields, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, 22 (1921); Report of the
United States Coal Commission on Civil Liberties in the Coal Fields (mimeograph)
12-13 (1923) ; George Soule, "Unions and the Public," 133 ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
211. 219 (1924).
236 U. S. 1, 19-20 (1915).
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just as the employer may decline to offer employment on any
other; for 'it takes two to make a bargain'."
In other words, the privilege of refusing to contract is an inte-
gral part of freedom of contract, and neither party to a prospec-
tive agreement can maintain that his constitutional rights are
being impaired when the other party refuses to enter into a con-
tract with him on some particular basis which he desires, but which
the other party does not desire.
The next question is as to what legal protection is available to
an employer who desires to exercise his constitutional right to op-
erate a non-union closed shop. It is clear that intimidation and
violence, whether directed against the employer who is running
his plant on a non-union basis or against his non-union employees,
is interdicted"5 ; and that the circulating of false statements as to
the* employer or his non-union employees, or as to the facts of a
particular controversy, is unlawful 2. It is further settled, at least
in the federal courts, that so-called "peaceful picketing", if car-
ried out under such circumstances that it will naturally result in
intimidation or violence, or "moral coercion' '33, is unlawful and
may be enjoined34 .
-t Goldberg v. Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal. 429, 86 Pac. 806 (1906); O'Neill v.
Behanna, 182 Pa. St. 236, 37 Atl. 843 (1897) ; Southern R. R. Co. v. Machinists
Union, 111 Fed. 49 (1901) Knudson v. Bena, 123 Fed. 636 (1903) ; Fortney v.
Carter, 203 Fed. 454 (1913) ; Bittner v. West Virginia Coal Co. 214 Fed. 716 (1914).
.I. Martineau v. Foley, 231 Mass. 220. 120 N. E. 445 (1918) ; Beck v. Rhilway
Teamsters Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898).
31 See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 302, 327 (1921), referring to the character
-of the picketing involved there; "It was not lawful persuasion or inducing. It was
not a mere appeal to the sympathetic aid of would-be customers by a simple state-
ment of the strike and a request to withhold patronage. It was compelling every
customer or would-be customer to run the gauntlet of most uncomfortable publicity;
aggressive and annoying importunity, libelous attacks and fear of injurious conse-
quences, illegally Inflicted, to his reputation and standing in the community. No,
wonder that a business of $50,000 was reduced to only one-fourth of its former extent.
Violence could not have been more effective. It was moral coercion by illegal
annoyance and obstruction and it thus was plainly a conspiracy." (Italics supplied.)
31 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Cities Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921).
The exact scope of the decision is in doubt, although it certainly supports the
proposition stated in the text. In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 340 (1921), Taft,
C. J., said: "We held that . . . . picketing was unlawful, and that it might be
enjoined as such, and that peaceful picketing was a contradiction in terms which the
statute sedulously avoided, but that, subject to the primary right of the employer
and his employees and would-be employees to free access to his premises without
'obstruction by violence, intimidation, annoyance, Importunity or dogging, it was
lawful for ex-employees on a strike and their fellows in a labor union to have a
single representative at each entrance of the plant o fthe employer to announce
the strike and peaceably to persuade the employees and would-be employees to
Join them in it." Compare Brandies. J., dissenting, In the same case, 257 U. S.
312, 371: " . . . . This court has recently held that peaceful picketing is not
unlawful." The lower federal courts hold picketing unlawful when it is shown
to have an intimidating effect In fact. American Steel & Wire Co. V. Wire Drawers
& Die Makers' Unions Nos. 1 and 3, 90 Fed. 608 (1898) ; Atchison, etc. R. Co.
v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (1905) ; Stephens v. Ohio State Tel. Co., 240 Fed. 759 (1917).
Some state courts hold picketing to be unlawful pr se. Lyons & Healy V. Piano
Workers Union, 289 Ill. 176, 124 N. E. 443 (1919); Re Langell, 178 Mich. 304.
144 N. W. 481 (1914) ; Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896) ;
Baasch v. Cooks' Union, 99 Wash. 378, 169 Pae. 843 (1918). Others, however,
bold that peaceful picketing is lawful. Jones v. Van Winkle Machine Works, 131 Ga.
.336, 62 S. E. 336 (1908) ; White Mountain Freezer Co. v. Murphy, 78 N. H. 398,
101 AtI. 357 (1917) ; Everett Waddy Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, 105 Va.
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Can such action be rendered lawful by statute? In the case
of Truax v. Corrigan-", there was involved a statute of the State
of Arizona in terms denying the remedy of injunction to one whose
business was injured in the course of a dispute between him and
his employees or former employees. The plaintiff's bill alleged
that the defendants, his former employees, were engaged in picket-
ing plaintiff's restaurant, that they were circulating false state-
ments about plaintiff and his present employees, and that they were
using threatening and abusive language to prospective patrons 37.
188, 53 S. E. 273 (1906). A statute declaring picketing illegal is constitutional.
Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. -v. Cruise, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914). And municipal
ordinances to the same effect have been held reasonable. Re Williams, 158 Cal.
550, 111 Pac. 1035 (1910) ; Ex parte Stout, 82 Tex. Cr. 183, 198 S. W. 967 (1917).
The sound view would seem to be that, while peaceful picketing is not per se
illegal, the court will be astute to see that it really Is peaceful, and will recognize
that there may be Intimidation by mere numbers. It is believed that this is the
proper interpretation of the decision in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Cities Trades
Council, supra. If the sort of picketing in fact carried out is unlawful, it "may
properly be enjoined by the specific term because its meaning is clearly understood
in the sphere of controversy by those who are parties to it." American Steel Foundries
v. Tr-Citles Trades Council, supra, 205.
It should be noted that the federal courts are not bound by state law in labor
cases. Loewe v. California Federation of Labor, 189 Fed. 714 (1911). Hence the
doctrine of American Foundries Co. v. Tr-Cities Trades Council, supra, is binding
on the lower federal courts regardless of the local state law.
257 U. S. 312 (1921).
34 1913 Ariz. Rev. Stats., Paragraph 1464. "No restraining order or injunction
shall be granted by any court of this state, or a Judge or the judges thereof, in any
case between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or
between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving or growing
out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary
to prevent irreparable injury to property or to a property right of the party making
the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such
property or property right must be described with particularity in the application,
which must be In writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons
from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work
or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means
so to do; or from attending at or near a house or place where any person resides or
works, or carries on business,or happens to be for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
or communicating information, or of peacefully persuading any person to work or to
abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such
dispute; or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so
to do ........ .As to the effect of the statute as construed by the Supreme Court
of Arizona, see note 40, infra.
37 See Truax v. Corrigan, supra, 325-327 (1921) ; "The complaint and its
exhibits make this case:
"The defendants conspired to injure and destroy plaintiff's business by inducing
their heretofore willing patrons and would-be patrons not to patronize them and they
influenced these to withdraw or withhold their patronage;
.(1) By having the agents of the union walk forward and back constantly during
all the business hours in front of plaintiff's restaurant and within five feet thereof,
displaying a banner announcing in large letters that the restaurant was unfair to
cooks and waiters and their union.
"(2) By having agents attend at or near the entrance of the restaurant during
all business hours and continuously announce in a loud voice, audible for a great
distance, that the restaurant was unfair to the labor union.
"(3) By characterizing the employees of the plaintiffs as scab Mexican labor,
and using opprobrious epithets concerning them in hand-bills continuously distributed
in front of the restaurant to would-be customers.
1(4) By applying in such handbills abusive epithets to Truax, the senior member
of the plaintiff's firm, and making libelous charges against him, to the effect that
he was tyrannical with his help, and chased them down the street with a butcher
knife, that he broke his contract and repudiated his pledged word; that he bad
made attempts to force cooks anl waiters to return to work by attacks on men and
women; that a friend of Truax assaulted a woman and pleaded guilty; that plaintiff"
was known by his friends, and that Truax's treatment of his employees was explained
by his friend's assault; that he was a 'bad actor.'
"(5) By seeking to disparage plaintiff's restaurant, charging that the prices
were higher and the food worse than In any other restaurant, and that assaults
and slugging were a regular part of the bill of fare, with police indifferent.
"(6) By attacking the character of those who did patronize, saying that their
12
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The case came up on demurrer to the bill, so that these allegations
were admitted 8. Relying on the statute the state court denied an
injunction. It is uncertain whether the statute, as construed by the
Arizona Supreme Court, operated to legalize the acts complained of
or whether it was regarded as simply withdrawing the remedy of
injunction in labor cases.40  The Supreme Court of the United
States on writ of error reversed the judgment, holding, in a five-
to-four decision, that if the statute purported to legalize the acts
complained of it was unconstitutional as a deprivation of proper-
ty without due process of law, and that if it simply purported to
withdraw the remedy of injunction, it involved a denial of the
equal protection of the laws. The decision has been sharply crit-
mental calibre and moral fibre fell far below the American average, and enquiring
of the would-be patrons-'Can you patronize such a place and look the world in the
face?'
"(7) By threats of similar injury to the would-be patrons-by such expressions as
'All ye who enter here leave all hope behind.' 'Don't be a traitor to humanity'; by
offering a reward for any of the ex-members of the union caught eating in the
restaurant; by saying in the handbills: 'We are also aware that handbills aXd
banners in front of a business house on the main street give the town a bad name,
but they are permanent institutions until William Truax agrees to the eight-hour
day.'
"(8) By warning any person wishing to purchase the business from the Truax
firm that a donation would be necessary, amount to be fixed by the District Trades
Assembly, before the picketing and boycotting would be given up.
"The result of this campaign was to reduce the business of the plaintiff from
more than $55,000. a year to one of $12,000."
ms See Truax v. Corrigan, supra, 324.
30 20 Ariz. 7, 176 Pac. 570 (1918). See also Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380, 19
Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121 (1918). Hence the United States Supreme Court had to
consider the statute as if its terms required the denial of an injunction under the
circumstances alleged in the bill. Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U. S., 503, 510 (1922);
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 (1923).
" The majority of the United States Supreme Court apparently thought that the
statute, as construed by the Supreme Court of Arizona, legalized the acts complained
of. See Truax v. Corrigan, supra, 329: "The opinion of the State Supreme Court in
this case if taken alone seems to show that the statute grants complete immunity from
any civil or criminal action to the defendants, for it pronounces their act lawful."
Ibid. 330: "If, however, contrary to the construction which we put on the opinion
of the Supreme Court of Arizona, it does not withhold from the plaintiffs all remedy
for the wrongs they suffered but only the equitable relief of injunction." Pitney
and Clarke, JJ., seem to have regarded the statute as simply withdrawing the remeuy
of injunction. See Truax v. Corrigan, supra, 349: "Paragraph 1464 does not
modify any substantive rule of law, but only restricts the processes of the courts of
equity." Brandeis, J., seems to have taken the same view. See Truax v. Corrigan,
supra, 356: "The questions submitted are whether this statutory prohibition of the
remedy by injunction is in itself arbitrary and so unreasonable, as to deprive
the employer of liberty or property without due process of law ;-and whether limita-
tion of this prohibition to controversies involving employment denies him equal
protection of the laws." But see ibid., 376. Holmes, J., the other dissentient, did
not clearly indicate his interpretation. See Truax v. Corrigan, supra, 342-343.
See also note 44, infra.
The construction put by the majority of the United States Supreme Court on the
action of the Arizona Supreme Court would seem to be supported by several state-
ments in the opinion of that court. See Truax v. Corrigan, 20 Ariz. 7, 11, 176 Pao,
570. 571 (1918) ; "The purpose of the statute in question is to recognize th-
right of workmen on strike to use peaceable means to accomplish the lawful ends,
for which the strike is called ...... The last contention is that the statute, havin-
attempted to legalize picketing when peaceably carried on for any purpose. depriven:
plaintiffs of its property without due process of law, and denies to plaintiffs the equa4
protection of the law." (Italics supplied.)
It should be noted that the Arizona court regarded the statute as legalizing:
peaceful picketing, and apparently held the particular act of picketing involved"
to be peaceful, while the Supreme Court of the United States held that the picketing
was not peaceful, and that a statute legalizing such picketing as alleged in the bill
was invalid. It can hardly be contended that the Arizona court was right in holding-
that the acts alleged in the bill constjtuted "peaceful" picketing. See note 34,,
supra. See, however, 20 Ariz. 7, 12, 176 Pac. 570, 572 (1918).
Hence all the case can be taken as deciding is (1) that a statute attempting tQ
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icized 41, and it would certainly seem that Mr. Chief Justice Taft's
view on the point as to equal protection of the laws is open to ques-
tion42. To say that while a classification based on the relation of
employer and employee is a reasonable one43, a classification based
on the relation of employer and ex-employee on strike is beyond the
bounds of reason, would seem to involve a doctrinaire insistence
on a purely legal conception which does not take into account the
actual facts of the situation. As an original question it would
seem very doubftul as to whether a classification of this sort was
not a reasonable one4 4 . But the Supreme Court has decided other-
wise, and there is no good reason to believe that the decision will
legalize completely the kind of picketing alleged in the bill to have been carried out
by the defendants in this particular ca.,e is not due process; (2) that a statute with-
drawing the remedy of injunction in such case is a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. It does not decide (1) that a statute making legal really peaceful picketing is not
,due process, or (2) that a statute withdrawing the remedy of injunction In labor
cases only is not due process. It should be noted that the acts of the defendants
in this case involved the spreading of false statements, as to the illegality of which
at common law there has never been any question. See note 32, suprat.
41 See 10 Cor. L. REV. 237 (1922) ; 7 CORN. L. QuART. 251 (1922) ; 22 COL. L,
REV. 252 (1922) : 20 MrcH. L. Rsv. 657 (1922) ; 28 W. VA. L. QuAR. 144 (1922) ;
31 YALE L. J. 408 (1922). But see 8 Am. BAR ASSN. JounN. 5106 and 8 VA. L. REV.
.374. supporting the case.
2 It should be noted that Pitney and Clark. JJ. did not disagree with the majority
holding that if the Arizona statute legalized the wrong complained of in the bill, it
violated the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their dissent was
predicated on the theory that the statute simply withdrew the remedy of injunction.
;See note 40, supra. Hence, the only question of due process considered by them was
the propriety of such a limitation of the equity jurisdiction. Their conclusion
-that such a limitation was due process was not in disagreement with the majority.
which rested the decision on this branch of the case simply on the equal protection
,lause. Brandeis, J., did disagree with the majority on all the points involved. See
Truax v. Corrigan, supra. 376. The view of Holmes, J., Is not entirely clear.
See note 40, supra. Thus the decision is really five-to-four on the equal protection
point only.
, This is well established. See Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1,
53 (1912) ; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 218 (1917) ; Middleton v. Texas
Power and Light Co., 249 U. S. 152, 157 (1919).
" Taft, C. J., says on this point: "It seems a far cry from classification on the
basis of the relation of employer and employee in respect of injuries received in course
of employment to classification based on the relation of an employer, not to an
employee, but to one who has ceased to be so, in respect of torts thereafter committed
by such ex-employee on the business and property right of the employer. It Is
really a little difficult to say If such classification can be sustained, why special
legislative treatment of assaults upon an employer or his employees by ex-employees
may not be sustained with equal reason. It is said the State may deal separately with
such disputes because such controversies are a frequent and characteristic outgrowth
of disputes over terms and conditions of employment. Violence of ex-employees toward
present employees is also a characteristic of such disputes. Would this justify a
legislature in excepting ex-employees from criminal prosecution for such assaults and
leaving the assaulted persons to suits for damages at common law?" See Truax
v. Corrigan, supra, 339. While this may be sound (admitting that the plaintiff
may properly raise the point, as to which see infra, this note), It does not neces-
sarlly bear on the propriety of simply withdrawing the remedy of injunction. The
rationale of the classification is well put by Holmes, J., in his dissenting opinion:
"And especially I think that without legalizing the conduct complained of the extra-
ordinary relief by injunction may be denied to the class. Legislation may begin
m here an evil begins. If, as many intelligent people believe, there is more danger
that the injunction will be abused in labor cases than elsewhere, I can feel no
do,)t of the power of the legislature to deny it in such cases." See Truax v.
Corrigan, supra, 343.
There is the further question of whether, even if there is an improper discrimination,
this particular plaintiff is injured by It. The reasoning of Pitney, J., seems persua-
sive on this point. See Truax v. Corrigan, supra, 350: "It is said that because.
under other provisions of the Arizona statute law, plaintiffs would have been entitled
to an injunction against such a campaign as that conducted by defendants, had it
been in a controversy other than a dispute between employer and former employees-
for instance, had competing restaurant-keepers been the offenders-refusal of relief
in the particular case by force of Paragraph 1464 is undue favoritism to the class of
14
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not be followed, especially since it is supported by at least one
state decision on the identical point45. It would therefore seem
that an attempt of a state legislature to withdraw the remedy of
injunction in labor cases is unconstitutional, and that any attempt
to legalize picketing of an intimidating or deceitful sort, wheth-
er made by a state legislature or by Congress, is unconstitutional.
The question remains as to whether attempts to persuade non-
union employees to strike or quit, unaccompanied by intimidation
or violence, are unlawful. Unless such employees are under in-
dividual contract not to join a labor organization 4 , it is clear that
such persuasion is proper 47 Where the employees have made in-
dividual contracts not to join a labor union, the case of Hitchman
Coal & Coke Company v. Mitchells, is an apparent authority to
the effect that peaceful persuasion to join the union may be enjoin-
ed, on the theory that such persuasion involves the unlawful in-
ducement of a breach of contract. 4 The Hitchman case, however,
is not as clear an authority on this point as it has sometimes
which defendants are members. But I submit with deference that this Is not a matter
of which plaintiffs are entitled to complain under the 'equal protection' clause.
There is no discrimination as against them; others situated like them are accorded
no greater right to an injunction than is accorded to them. Whatever complaint the
competing restaurant-keepers might have, if in the case supposed they were subject
to be stopped by an injunction where former employees were not, it would not be a
denial of equal protection to plaintiffs. Cases arising under this clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, preeminently, call for the application of the settled rule that
before one may be heard to oppose state legislation upon the ground of its repugnance
to the Federal Constitution he must bring himself within the class affected by the
alleged unconstitutional feature." But see Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, 161, 112
N. B. 853, 858 (1916).
S Bognt v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 152. 112 N. E. 853 (1916). See also Goldberg v.
Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal. 429, 86 Pac. 806 (1906); George Jones Glass Co v.
Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 77 N. J. Eq. 219, 79 Atl. 262 (1908).
18 These contracts, termed by some union leaders "yellow-dog contracts." have
frequently been resorted to by employers as a means of defense against intimidation
and violence directed at their non-union employees. This has been especially true
in the coal industry of West Virginia. which has been repeatedly subjected to
militant attacks by the United line Workers of America. See Brief on "The
United Aline Workers in West Virginia," submitted to the United States Coal Commis-
sion by the Bituminous Operators' Special Committee, passim (1923).
11 American Steel Foundries-v. Trl-Clties Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921)
Gasaway v. Borderland Coal Corp., 278 Fed. 56 (1921), modifying 275 Fed. 871
(1920) ; Michaels v. Hillman. 112 Misc. 395, 183 N. Y. Suppl. 195 (1920).
's 245 U. S. 229 (1917).
' The decision is based on the principle that it is a tort to induce a breach
of contract. This doctrine had its origin in the case of Lumley v. Gye, 2 El.
& BI. 216 (1853). It is thoroughly established in England. Bowen -V. Hall, 6 Q. B. D.
353 (1881) ; Temperton v. Russell (1893) 1 Q. B. 715. It was at first applied there
to cases of inducement to break labor contracts. South Wales Miners' Federation v.
Glamorgan Coal Co. (1905) A. C. 239. But there is now a statutory exception
in such cases. See Trades Disputes Act, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, § 3 (1906).
The doctrine is generally accepted in the United States, although a few states
have rejected it. See Francis B. Sayre. "Inducing Breach of Contract," 36 HARV.
L. REv. 663, 671, notes 26 and 27 (1923). West Virginia has adopted the doctrine.
Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke, 59 W. Va. 253, 53 S. E. 161 (1906). The Hitchman case
involved West Virginia law.
It should be noted that the question discussed in the text does not arise in
states which do not accept the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye. In Kentucky, the doctrine
is rejected except as to enticing away apprentices or persons under contracts of serv-
ice for fixed term. This latter class of persons is further confined to farm laborers.
Bourlier Bros. v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, 14 S. W. 60 (1891). Hence in that state
peaceful persuasion of employees not under fixed-term non-union contracts to
Join the union is allowed. See Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
188 Ky. 477, 222 S. W. 1079 (1920).
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been regarded. It is true that the order in the case did enjoin
peaceful persuasion, but the ground for the decision is not ab-
solutely certain. Certainly one of the rationes decidendi was the
fact that the means used by the union organizers were deceitful
and unlawful, independent of the fact that they involved procur-
ing a breach of contract. Thus, in American Foundries v. Tri-Cities
Trades CouncilV°, Mr. Chief Justice Taft said: "The unlawful and
deceitful means used were quite enough to sustain the decision of
the court without more." Although it is probable that the case is an
authority for the proposition that any attempt to persuade men to
join the union in the face of a contract not to do so is unlawful,
this cannot be taken as definitely settled.
There is a second question as to the scope of the decision in the
Hitcltman case which is not yet settled. In that case the contracts
in question involved simply a hiring at will. The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held that in view of this
fact that there was no illegality in persuading the plaintiffs'
employees to join the union5 1. The Supreme Court reversed this
holding and declared "that the employment was 'at will', and
terminable by either party at any time, is of no consequence ",2
citing its earlier decision in the case of Truax v. Raioh55 . Does
this mean that it is unlawful to persuade employees under individ-
ual non-union contracts to terminate those contracts and join the
union, or does it simply mean that it is unlawful to induce such
employees to join the union and to remain in the employment in
violation of their contract? In the case of Gasaway v. Border-
land Coal Corporation54 , the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has adopted the second interpretation, and has said
that there is no illegality in "using lawful persuasion to induce
any one of appellee's employees to join the union and thereupon
immediately and openly to sever his relationship with the appellee,
not in violation of, but in exact accordance with, his contract with
the appellee.' '5 This interpretation somewhat limits the broad
language used in the Hitclman case.
Although the exact scope of the decision in the Hitchman case
- 257 U. S. 184, 211 (1921).
'x Mitchell v .Hitchman Coal & Coke Co., 214 Fed. 685 (1914).
" Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 251 (1917).
239 U. S. 33 (1915). This was not a case involving inducement of breach
of contract, as such, but one In which state officials threatened proceedings under an
unconstitutional statute unless the plaintiff's employer discharged plaintiff. The
decision, however, is clearly in point. See Truax v. Roach, Supra.278 Fed. 56 (1921).
278 Fed. 56, 64 (1921).
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is thus somewhat doubtful,56 there are several state decisions hold-
ing that it is unlawful peacefully to persuade employees working
under individual non-union contracts to join the union and still
remain in the employment, and that such persuasion may be en-
joined, even though the employment is at will.5 7  Whether or not
the qualification suggested in Gasaway v. Borderland Coal Corpor-
ations"s will prevail can hardly be predicted; but it would seem to
be a reasonable one.
5 9
Assuming that the rule is established in a particular jurisdiction
that peaceful persuasion of a man's employees to join the union
and remain in the employment may be enjoined when those employ-
ees have contracted not to join the union, the further question
arises as to whether that rule can be changed by statute. This
result might conceivably be attained in three ways: (1) by prohib-
iting the making of individual contracts not to join the union;
(2) by providing that persuasion to break such contracts should
not give rise to any cause of action at all; or (3) by withdrawing
the remedy of injunction in such cases.
It is clear that the first method, that of prohibiting by statute the
requiring of individual contracts not to join the union, would be
unconstitutional. It was just such a statute that was condemned
in Coppage v. Kansas
Would it be possible to reach the same result by a statute of the
second sort, doing away with the rule of Lumley v. G 7e?61 It might
seem, at first glance, that since there are some states which reject
the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye entirely, those jurisdictions which
have accepted it through their courts may later reject it through
their legislatures without violating the Fourteenth Amendment.
This view has been powerfully urged in other cases by Mr. Justice
Holmes.'32 There is a certain plausibility in the contention that a
statute changing the law of one state so as to be in accord with the
53 See Francis B. Sayre, "Inducing Breach of Contract," 36 HARV. I R:v.
663, 691-694, and especially note 81 (1923).
37 See Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U. S. 275 (1917) ; McMichael v. Atlanta
Envelope Co.. 151 Ga. 776, 108 S. E. 226 (1921); Third Avenue Railroad Co. v.
Shea, 109 Misc. 18, 179 N. Y. Suppl. 43 (1919), affd. 191 App. Div. 949, 181 N. Y.
Suppl. 936 (1920) ; Cyrus Currier & Sons v. International Moulders Union, 93 N. J.
Eq. 61, 115 AtI. 66 (1921); Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke, 59 W. Va. 253, 53 S. E.
161 (1906).
'5 278 Fed. 56 (1921).
51 It may be added that it is clear that there is no liability for inducing breach
of contract unless the third person knew of the contract. Piermont v. Schlesinger,
196 App. Div. 658, 188 N. Y. Suppl. 35 (1921).
0) 236 U. S. 1 (1915). See p. 132-133, supra.
2 El. & BI. 216 (1853).
In The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 404 (1907): " . . as the state courts in their
decisions would follow their own notions about the law and might change them from
time to time, it would be strange if the State might not make changes by its other
mouthpiece, the legislature." And in his dissenting opinion in Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U. S. 312, 343 (1921) "1 cannot understand the notion that it would be
unconstitutional to authorize boycotts and the like in aid of the employees' or
the employers' interest by statute when the same result has been reached
constitutionally without statute by courts with whom I agree."
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common law in force in another state is not so arbitrary and un-
reasonable as to fail in due process of law. But it is well established
that the extent of the reviewing power over erroneous decisions
of state courts is not coextensive with that over arbitrary action of
state legislatures ;s3 and hence the fact that the courts of one state
have adopted a certain rule through judicial decision, does not
mean that that rule, if adopted by the legislature of another state,
would not be held, and properly, to involve a denial of due process
of law."4 The fact that a rule of law has not been universally
1 See Arrowsmith v. Harmoning, 118 U. S. 194, 195 (1886) ; In re Converse, 137
U. S. 624, 731 (1891); Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 112 (1895);
Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126, 135 (1903); Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U. S..
164, 173 (3906) ; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 461 (1907) ; Laurer v. New
York, 206 U. S. 536, 547 (1907); Bonner v. uorham, 213 U. S. 86, 91 (1909).
See also Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 U. S. 380 (1894) ; Frank v. Mangum,
239 U. S. 309 (1915). Cf. Raymhond v. Chicago Traction Co., 127 U. S. 20, 49
(1907) per Holmes, J., dissenting. It is clear that ass erroneous finding of fact
by the state court is not a denial of due process of law. Dower v. Richards, 151
U. S. 658 (1894). An erroneous decision as to jurisdiction is a denial of due process.
of law. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878); Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn.
v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 (1907). This is true where the decision is as to the
jurisdiction of the court (i. e., as to its competence, to borrow a phrase from the civil
law), as well as where it is as to the jurisdiction of the sovereign crenting the-
court Thus, where a state probate court, in the absence of a statute authorizing
it, grants administration of the estate of a person not in fact dead, such action is
not due process. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 (1894). See also Lavin V.
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 18 Blatch. 1, 1 Fed. 641 (1880). But the.
legislature of a state may give the courts of that state such jurisdiction. Cunnius,
v. Reading School District, 198 U. S. 458 (1905). This makes it clear that the
question is not one of substantive limitation. If it were, the action of the legislature
would also be invalid. In addition to jurisdiction there must be a real judicial
proceeding. Hence, If the court is dominated by mob violence so that there is not
really a fair trial, there is denial of due process. Moore v. Dempsy, 261 U. S. 26
(1923). Cf. Frank v. Mangum, supra. And see 37 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1923). And
unfair procedure in a state court may be a denia, of due process. Saunders v.
Shaw, 244 U. S. 317 (1917). But if there Is a real judicial proceeding in a court
having jurisdiction and if the procedure is fair, there is no denial of due process
v en though the decision of the court be erroneous. It has been suggested that if
he decision is not only erroneous, but so arbitrary that a statute enacting the.
same rule would be held invalid as denying due process of law, the decision of the
state court may be reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States on constitu-
tional grounds. See ScHOFIELD, EssAys iN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQGITY. 1-101
(1921). See also 28 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1915) ; 36 HARV. L. REv. 1020, 1022
(1923). There are casual dicta to the same effect in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 234, 241, 247 (1897), and in Bacitus v. Fort
Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 575 (1898). But this seems unsound. As.
applied to state legislative action, the Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation on
substance, and not on form. As applied to state judicial action, it Is a limitation on
form and not on substance. See Laurence Curtis, 2nd.. "Judicial Review of
Commission Rate Regulation," 34 HARv. L. REv. 862, 863-869 (1921). The
Found principle is well stated by Curtis, op. cit. 868: ... under the due-
process clause a federal question can be raised by challenging the substance of a
legislative act or (perhaps) court procedure, but not by challenging the procedure
of a legislative act or the substance of a judicial decision."
6, The dissenting opinions of Holmes, J., and Brandeis, J., in Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U. S. 312, 343, 371 (1921), failed to recognize this difference in the scope
of the reviewing power. They regarded the statute involved in that case as changing
the law of Arizona to conform to the judicially declared law of certain other
jurisdictions, and relied upon that view of the case as sustaining the constitutionality
of the statute. This reasoning seems erroneous. In theory, at least, a court in
deciding a case is declaring, not malking law. See Robert Von Moschzisker,.
"Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort." 37 HARV. L. REv., 409, 413 (1924).
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents arbitrary law-making-
by legislatures, not arbitrary law-alpplication by courts. See note 61, supra. This
Is not inconsistent with the rule that if a state court construes a statute so as to
make It operate in an arbitrary manner, a federal question Is raised. In such case the
construction is regarded as becoming part of the statute for the purposes of the
particular case before the court. See Ward & Gow v. Krinsky. 259 U. S. 503,
510 (1922) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 68 L. Ed. 148 (1923) ; Robert von
Moschzisker, Op. cit., 422. See also St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co.
v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354 (1912) ; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 233
U. S. 325 (1914). Hence the situation is the same as if the statute had been passed
to cover the particular ease to which it is applied. See note 39, s'pra. An analogous
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adopted by the courts may be the persuasive evidence that a statute
abolishing the rule where it has been adopted is a reasonable statute
and so due process of law; but in view of the difference in scope
of the reviewing power, it cannot be conclusive evidence.
In the present case, such a statute, if enacted by a state
legislature, and if it applied to labor cases alone,"5 would seem
clearly to fall within the rule enunciated in Truax v. Corrigan68 as
to the equal protection of the laws, and so would be invalid. Whether
it would be held to be due process of law is doubtful. It would
seem to be the logical result of the proposition as to due process
laid down in the same case that the statute would be invalid,
since the possible justification for such a change in the law is much
the same as that which was urged in favor of legalizing
picketing and so-called "moral coercion," and which was there
held insufficient. It is true that the case is not so extreme, since
the employer would still have his remedy against the employee
who broke the contract. Neverthless, in view of the present temper
of the court, particularly as emphasized ill the Minimum Wage
Case," the prophecy may be ventured that such a legislative en-
actment, whether state or federal, would probably be declared un-
constitutional on the ground of due process, even though it applied
to inducing breach of contract generally, and not to labor cases
alone.
A state statute of the third sort, simply denying the remedy
of injunction, while leaving open the remedy of common-law
damages against the third person inducing the breach of contract,
would, if applied to labor. cases only, be a denial of equal protection
of the laws under the Truax decision. If applied generally it would
seem to be valid, since there is certainly no vested right in the
unchanged continuance of the present equity jurisdiction. Sure-
ly the legislature can alter the character of remedies even
though it is not to be allowed to extinguish rights.
It is to be noted, moreover, that the constitutional objections
distinction is recognized in dealing with cases arising under the clause of the federal
Constitution prohibiting laws impairing the obligation of contracts. U. S. CONST.,
ART. I, § 10. It is clear that the decision of a state court on a matter of common
law which results in impairing the obligation of a prior contract does not raise
a federal question under this clause. Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 511
(1871) ; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 (1895) ; McCoy v. Union Elevated
Railroad Co., 247 U. S. 354 (1918). This is true even though the interpretation of
a statute enacted prior to the making of the contract is involved. Central Land Co.
v. Laidley, supra. But if the state court construes a statute passed after a contract
is made in such a way as to impair a prior contract obligation, a federal question is
raised. Muhlker v. New York and Harlem R. R. Co., 197 U. S. 544 (1905).
w There is such a statute in England. Trades Disputes Act, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47,
3 (1906). See note 49. supra.
257 U. S. 312 (1921).
07 Minimum Wage Board v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923). Cf. a
vigorous criticism of this case by T. R. Powell, "Judiciality of Minimum Wage
Legislation," 37 HARv. L. RV. 545 (1924).
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to the denial of the remedy of injunction, whether in the case of
picketing or in cases of procurement of breach of contract, which
apply in the case of state action, are not applicable in the case of
action by Congress. The unconstitutionality of simply denying
the remedy of injunction, as distinguished from complete legali-
zation of the injury, is rested by the Supreme Court upon the
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment as to the equal protection
of the laws, and not upon the provision as to due process of law.68
Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in Truax v. Corrigan,9  has pointed
out that: " . . . the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not apply to congressional but only to state action."
Therefore, there would seem to be no constitutional objection to
the denial of the remedy of injunction in cases arising under the
judicial power of the United States, even though the statute deny-
ing the remedy applies only in labor controversies.
It should be noted that the labor provisions of the Clayton Act
7 0
do not raise this question. Although on their face those provisions
might seem to limit the remedy of injunction in the way condemned,
so far as state legislation is concerned, in the Truax case, the con-
struction placed upon them by the courts is otherwise. In the
case of American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Cities Central Trades
Council,71 Mr. Chief Justice Taft said, referring to the provisions
of Section 20 of the Act: "It is merely declaratory of what was
the best [equity] practice always." This tendency to regard the
Act as purely declaratory has been manifested in other decisions.
7 2
Hence, no question of discrimination has arisen.
IV.
THE CLOSED UNION SHOP.
It has long been a rule of the common law that a contract which
operates to a serious extent to deprive an individual or individuals
of the opportunity of earning their livelihood at their trade or oc-
cupation is contrary to pubile policy, and therefore unenforceable.
7 3
6 See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 330 (1921).
69 257 U. S. 312, 340 (1921), See notes 13 and 14. supra.
70 38 Stat. at L. 730, 6 Fed. Stat. Ann. 139, 9 b. 730 (1914). See especially
§§ 6 and 20 of the Act.
71 257 U. S. ISA, 203 (1921). It has been squarely held that § 20 of the Cayto'i
Act does not forbid an injunction against inducing breach of contracts through
peaceful persuasion in labor cases. Kinloch Tel. Co. v. Local Union No. 2, 275 Fed.
241 (1921), reversing 265 Fed. 312 (1920). See Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.
v. Retail Clerks International Protective Association, 250 Fed. 890 (1918).
73 See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 468 (1921); Dail-
Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland, 263 Fed. 171 (1919), affd. sub norn. Quinlivan v.
Dail-Overland Co., 274 Fed. 56 (1921). CI. Francis B. Sayre, "The Clayton
Act Construed," THE SuavEy, Jan. 22, 1921; 37 HARV. L. REV. 486 (1924).
3 See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 (1711) ; Kellog v. Larkln, 3 Penn
(Wis.) 133 (1851) ; Kales, Contracts and Combinations in Restraint of Trade, § 1,
(1918) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1652 (1920).
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This question has generally come up as to contracts made by an
individual himself, such as contracts not to compete or not to
engage in a particular business, which are universally held invalid
when they restrain the exercise of the individual's trade for an
unreasonable time or over an unreasonable territory." But it
applies as well to contracts which unreasonably prevent third
persons from earning a livelihood.7 5 In conformity with this prin-
ciple it has been generally held that a union closed shop agrcement
which is effective over an entire industry, or over so much of an
industry as operates in a particular locality, is unenforceable as
contrary to public policy, because it operates to prevent all men
who do not wish to become members of the union from earn;,ng
a livelihood. 6
When an agreement applies simply to the establishment of a
single employer, there is no general deprivation of the right of
non-union men to work, and such agreements are universally held
valid.7 7  Hence, if a non-union man is required by the employer
to join the union or be discharged, he has no cause for complaint.
7 8
Furthermore, it is generally held that a strike to compel the unioni-
zation of a shop is lega 9 although there are some courts that
have come to a contrary conclusion. In most of the minority
jurisdictions, however, the employer has no standing in court
to enjoin a strike to unionize his shop,81 although a non-union
71 Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66 (1884) ; Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469
(1888). Gamewell Fire Alarm Co. v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50 (1893) ; Trenton Potteries
Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507 (1899) ; Berlin Machine Works v. Perry, 71 Wis.
49 (1888).
-' See Grasel Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244, 249, 160 N. Y.
Suppl. 279, 281 (1918).
, Conners v. Connelly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 AtI. 600 (1913) ; Curran v. Galen, 152
N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297 (1897) ; McCord v. Thompson Starrett Co., 139 App. Div.
130 113 N. Y. S. 385 (1908), affd. 198 N. Y. 587, 92 N. E. 1090 (1910). See
also Skinsky v. Tracey, 226 Mass. 21, 114 N. E., 957 (1917).
See cases cited in notes 79, 81 and 85, infra.
' See cases cited in notes 79 and 85, infra.
" Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909); Parkinson v.
Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (1908) ; Cohn & Roty Electric
Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, 92 Conn. 161, 101 AtI. 659 (1917) ; Jetton-Dekle Co. v.
Mather, 53 Ala. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907); Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213,
99 N. E., 329 (1912) (practically overruling O'Brien v. People, 216 I1. 354, 75
N. E. 108 : Construction Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 161 N.
W. 520 (1917) Gray v. Bldg. Trades Council, 91 Minn. 167, 171, 185, 97 N. w.
663 (1903) ; State v. Employers of Labor, 102 Neb. 768, 774, 169 N. W. 717, 170
N. W. 185 (1918); Nat'l Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E.
369 (1902) ; Kissam v. U. S. Printing Co., 199 N. Y. 76, 92 N. E. 214 (1910) ;
Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917). See also
State v. Van Pelt, 136 N. C. 633, 49 S. E. 177 (1904) ; Roddy v. United Mine
Workers, 41 Okla. 621, 139 Pac. 126 (1914) ; Sheehan v. Levy, 215 S. W. 229
(Tex. Civ. App., 1919). This is the English rule. White V. Riley (1921) 1 Ch. 1;
Wolstenholme v. Ause, (1920) 2 Ch. 403.
90 Lucke v. Clothing Cutters, 77 Md. 396, 26 Atl. 505 (1893) ; Ruddy v. Plumbers,
70 N. J. L.,467, 75 Atl. 742 (1910) ; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79, 56 Ati.
327 (1903); Bausbach v. Reiff. 244 Pa. St. 559, 91 AtI. 224 (1914); State V.
Dyer, 7 Vt 690, 32 AtI. 814 (1895).
IL Mayer v. Journeyman Stone Cutters Assn., 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 AtI. 492 (1890)
Jersey Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 AtI. 230 (1902) ; State ax rel.
Roberts Mitchell Furniture Co. V. Toole, 26 Mont. 22, 66 Pac. 496 (1901).
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workman already employed may enjoin a strike to compel his
.discharge, or may recover damages if he is discharged as a result of
such a strike.2 The most extreme position is taken by the courts cf
Massachusetts and Oregon, which hold that a strike to compel
collective bargaining on a union closed shop basis may be enjoined
by the employer.8 3 The rationale of this doctrine is best expressed
by Mr. Justice Knowlton in the case of Berry v. Donovan,8" where.
the court said:
"The attempt to force all laborers to join in unions is agaiinst
the policy of the law because it aims at monopoly."
Even in Massachusetts, however, a union closed shop agreemont
is not illegal per se; and when once made, it may be enforced either-
by the union or the employer without liability to non-union men
who are discharged in consequence. 5
The Supreme Court of the United States has distinctly sta.ed
that the union closed shop is legal. Thus it is said in Coppage v.
Kansas :s6
"Can it be doubted that a labor organization-a voluntary
association of working men-has the inherent and constitutionaT
right to deny membership to any man who will not agree that
during such membership he will not accept or retain employment
in company with non-union men? Or that a union man has the
constitutional right to decline proffered employment unless the
employer will agree not to employ any non-union men? (In a'!
cases we refer, of course, to agreements made voluntarily, and
without coercion or duress as between the parties. And we
have no reference to questions of monopoly, or interference with
the rights of third parties or the general public. These involve
other considerations, respecting which we intend to intimate
no opinion.)"
Similarly, in Hitchman Coal & Coke Company v. Mitchell,
87 it
was said:
"The same liberty which enables men to form unions, and
through the union to enter into agreements with employers will-
ing to agree, entitles other men to remain independent of tNl
union, and other employers to agree with them to employ 3,0'
man who owes any allegiance or obligation to the union. In .Iie
82 Carter v. Oster, 134 Mo. App. 146, 112 S. W. 995 (1908) ; Roddy v. Plumlbr-,
79 N. J. L. 467, 75 AtI. 742 (1910). See also cases cited In note 80. suljr',.
83 Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011 (1900) ; United Shoe Mach'nc.-
Co. v. Fitzgerald, 237 Mass. 547, 130 N. E. 86 (1921) ; Hethemper v. Central L.a;
Council, 99 Ore. 1, 192 Pac. 765 (1920).
188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603 (1905).
Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 128 N. E. 429 (1914); Shlnsky r. C-,.
232 Mass. 99, 121 N. E. 790 (1919) ; Ryan v. Hayes 243 Mass. 168, 137 1N. - 2")
(1922). See also Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E. 429 U2
80 236 U. S. 1, 20 (1915).
245 U. S. 229, 250 (1917).
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latter case, as in the former, the parties are entitled to be pro-
tected by the law in the enjoyment of the benefits of any lawful
agreements they may make."
With these principles in mind, it is possible to approach the
problem of the constitutionality of legislation making unlawful
ullion closed shop agreements. Certainly legislation in furtherance
of the common-law rule against unreasonable restraints of trade
would be constitutional, even though it went somewhat further than
the decided cases have gone.8 The only serious question is as to
the constitutionality of a statute declaring that any closed shop
agreement is unlawful "because it aims at monopoly." The preceed-
ing quotations from Coppage v. Kansas,,9 and Hitch-aman Coal &
Coke Co. v. Mitcltell e° indicate a tendency to deny the validity of
such legislation.91 It is well settled, however, that the prevention of
monopoly is a purpose within the legitimate scope of the police.
power.9 2  Since the legislative prohibition of union closed shop
agreements may be reasonably regarded as a means for accomplish-
ing this purpose, it would follow that legislative action would be
valid. 93  It is dangerous to venture upon prophecy in the absence
of any decisions whatever,94 but it seems probable that a statute
prohibiting operation on the union closed shop basis would be.
held valid by the United States Supreme Court.
If there is no constitutional right to operate a closed union shop,
8, It cannot be doubted that the states may under the police power extend the
scope of existing rules of law to a reasonable extent. Thus the legislature may
increase the class of public nuisances by statute within reasonable limits. Littleton
v. Fritz, 65 Ia. 488, 22 N. V. 641 (1885) ; Chase v. Proprietors of Revere House,
232 Mass. 88, 122 N. B. 1C2 (1919). See Z. Chafee, Jr., "Progress of the Law,
1919-1920-Equitable Relief Against Torts," 34 HAnv. L. REv. 388, 399
(1921). The present case would ,eem to be an analgous one.
90 236 U. S. 1 (1915).
90 245 U. S. 229 (1917).
"I Note, however, the last part of the quotation from Coppage v. Kansas, 236-
U. S. 1, 20 (1915) : "In all cases we refer, of course, to agreements made voluntarily,
and without coercion or duress as between the parties. And we have no reference-
to questions of monopoly, or interference with the rights of third parties or the general
public. These involve other considerations, respecting which we intend to intimate no-
opinion."
0- See cases cited In note 8, supra.
93 If the result sought by legislation is within the purview of the police power.
and the statute has a reasonable tendency to reach that result, the statute is valid
as being due process of law. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 (1894) ; Chicago v.
Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561 (1905).
91 In Wright v. Hoctor, 95 Neb. 342, 145 N. W. 704 (1914) a statute requiring all
work in certain public improvements to be done by union labor was held Invalid, at
the suit of a taxpayer, as tending to increase the cost of the work and so to
deprive the taxpayer of property without due process of law. And there are numerous
decisions holding that municipal ordinances of a similar tenor are invalid as
unreasonable. Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789, 36 S. E. 933 (1900) ; Adams v. Brennan,
177 Ill. 194, 52 N. E. 314 (1898) ; Fiske v. People, 188 11. 206, 58 N. E. 985.
(1900) ; Miller v. Des Moines, 143 Ia. 409, 122 N. W. 226 (1909) ; Lewis v.,
Board of Education, 139 Mich. 306, 102 N. W. 756 (1905) ; Paterson Chronicle Co.
v. Paterson, 66 N. J. L. 129, 48 AtL. 589 (1901); Davenport v. Walker, 57 App.
Div. 221, 68 N. Y. S. 161 (1901); People v. John Single Paper Co., 112 App.
Div. 604, 98 N. Y. S. 965 (1906) ; Marshall & Co. v. Nashville, 109 Tenn.
495, 71 S. W. 815 (1902). Cf. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 (1903); Ellis v.
United States, 206 U. S. 246 (1907). Although these decisions are not directly in
point, they do tend to indicate the probable attitude of the courts In dealing:
with a statute prohibiting union closed shop contracts.
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it is unnecessary to consider whether the methods of protecting
that right are guaranteed by the Constitution. Any denial of
remedy would be simply a pro tanto denial of the right, which has
no constitutional protection. While the right exists the usual
methods of securing it must doubtless also exist; but any one of
such methods can be withdrawn by the legislature, provided, in the
case of the several states, that the equal protection of the laws




There are apparently no decisions which either affirm or deny
the existence of a constitutional right to operate on an open shop
basis. The only way the point could be squarely raised would be
by the passage of a statute forbidding open shop operation. No
such statute has ever been passed, and it seems unlikely that any
ever will be passed. However, it seems obvious that the same
principle as to liberty of contract which protects the right to
operate on the non-union closed shop basis would apply in the
case of the open shop. On the other hand, the possibility of
monopoly which might be invoked to justify prohibition of the
union closed shop could not be invoked in the case of the open
shop, since in the latter case there is no discrimination against eith-
er union or non-union men. It would seem to be immaterial whether
the particular form of open shop did or did not include collective
bargaining with the union.95
The remedies available to protect the constitutional right to
operate on the open shop basis are the same as those available to
protect the right to operate on a non-union closed shop basis, with
the single exception that the question of the effect of individual
contracts not to join a labor organization is not involved. Here,
as there, intimidation, violence, "moral coercion," and the cir-
culating of false statements are unlawful. Here, as there, they
cannot be legalized by statute, since the rule enunciated in Truax
v. Corrigan," must apply as well in cases of open shop operation
as in cases of non-union operation. Nor can the remedy of injunc-
tion be withdrawn by a state legislature in such cases without
violating the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing
25 The only possible bearing this question would have would be on the danger
of monopoly. It might be argued that open union shops could be prohibited, as
tending to become closed union shops, but this would seem to go too far.
96 257 U. S. 321 (1921).
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the equal protection of the laws. However, it would seem that
an open shop employer could not prevent peaceful persuasion of
his employees to join the union, even though the purpose of such
persuasion were the eventual complete unionization of the shop.9 7
VI.
SUMMARY
The conclusions which have been reached in this article may
be briefly summarized as follows:
As to the closed non-union shop:
(1) Under the existing law there is a right to operate on the
non-union closed shop basis.
This right cannot be taken away by legislation, either state or
national.
(2) Under existing law this right will be protected by the
award of damages or an injunction against persons seeking to inter-
fere with its exercise by means of intimidation, violence, "moral
coercion," or the circulation of false statements. In the absence
of individual contracts by the employees not to join a labor organi-
zatibn, it will not be protected by an injunction against persuading
employees so to join. If such contracts have been entered into,
an injunction will issue even against peaceful persuasion, at least
where it is of a deceitful sort, and where the persuasion is to break
and not simply to terminate the individual contracts.
Intimidation, violence, "moral coercion" and the circulation of
false statements cannot be legalized by legislation, either state or
national; nor can the remedy of injunction be withdrawn by state
legislatures. This remedy can probably be withdrawn by Congress,
however, as to cases within the federal judicial power. Legislation
legalizing the persuasion of employees to break individual con-
tracts not to join the union would probably be held invalid, whether
such legislation were state or national. Legislation withdrawing
the remedy of injunction against such persuasion would be held
invalid if passed by a state legislature, but not if passed by Congress.
As to the closed union shop
(1) Under existing law there is a right to operate a closed
union shop, so long as the agreement does not apply to all shops of
an industry or all those shops of an industry in a considerable
locality, though a minority of the states will not allow a strike to
9 See note 95, supra. See also Gasaway v. Borderland Coal Corp., 275 Fed. 56
(1921) ; Diamond Coal Co. v: United Mine Workers, 188 Ky. 477, 222 S. W. 1079
(1920). The employer could, of course, go over to the closed, non-union shop,
require individual non-union contracts, and so be protected even from peaceful
persuasion; but he could not continue to operate open shop and prevent such
persuasion.
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compel an employer to operate a union shop. If the agreement
does cover an entire industry or a considerable part of an industry
it may be invalid as an unreasonable restraint of trade.
The right to operate on the closed union shop basis can probably
be taken away by legislation, although this question has never been
adjudicated.
(2) Under existing law, the right to operate a closed union
shop may be protected by the ordinary remedies of injunction
or damages.
Since the right itself is probably not guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion the remedies securing it may be taken away without constitu-
tional objection, except in so far as this is done in a discriminatory
manner. In the case of discrimination, state legislation taking
away such remedies would be invalid.
As to the open shop:
(1) Under existing law there is a right to operate on an open
shop basis. It is immaterial whether or not there is any sort of
collective dealing with employees.
.This right cannot be taken away by legislation, either state or
national.
(2) Under existing law the right to operate on the open shop
basis may be protected by injunction or damages in case of intimi-
dation, violence, "moral coercion" or the circulation of false state-
ments.
Legislation attempting to legalize intimidation, violence, "moral
coercion," or the circulation of false statements is invalid, whether
state or national. State legislation, withdrawing the remedy of
injunction in labor cases, is invalid as denying the equal protection
of the law. Federal legislation of a similar type is probably valid.
VII.
These are the principles which have been laid down by the
decisions or which may fairly be expected to be laid down. They
represent the present rules of the industrial struggle. It is possible
that they may be limited by future decisions of the Supreme Court
or changed by constitutional amendment; but until they are so
changed or limited, it is incumbent upon all the parties to the in-
dustrial struggle to abide by them.
Some of the forms of industrial relationship which are protected
by the Constitution from legislative change may not be desirable
ones. In the judgment of some the non-union closed shop and
the individual non-union contract may seem undesirable forms
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of industrial relationship. To others the union closed shop may
seem equally undesirable. Still others may dislike the open shop,
whether union or non-union. There are arguments for and against
.all these forms of relationship, and employers, workers, and mem-
bers of the public will be found who support each of them and who
contend that the others should be abolished. It is the right
of the supporters of each to endeavor to prove the superiority of
their particular form, and it is the right of their opponents to point
out the defects of that form. But paramount to all these questions
of desirability is the fundamental principle of the legal order that
ehanges in the law must be made in the manner prescribed by the
law. It is not for the supporters of any particular form of indus-
trial relationship to urge or attempt the destruction of other forms
of relationship by extra-legal means. It is rather for them to
respect the rights of those who hold different theories than their
own, and to attempt to develop their own to the highest degree of
-social usefulness, in the confidence that the free competition of
the various forms of labor relationship will result in the ultimate
triumph of that form which best serves society as a whole.
27
Simpson: Constitutional Rights and the Industrial Struggle
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1924
